2 March 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR:	Deputy	Director	tor	Intelligence	

SUBJECT : Comments on Paper

on Soviet Motivations

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- 1. Overall, this paper does a good job of setting forth the main elements of current Soviet strategic weapons development programs and discussing the principal military and technological forces underlying their work. In this sense it provides an answer to the question—what are the most serious implications of these programs for US military planners, assuming their full potential is exploited and a high degree of success is achieved? In its present focus, then, the paper can stand on its own without alterations or additions. There are a few places where minor changes could be made for clarification purposes, and these are touched on in the attachment.
- 2. On what step to take for further dissemination of the paper: There is always the SNIE route. That would be educational for all concerned and should be considered. Of course, it would take time to run through the coordination process. If, instead, the decision is to put the paper out as an IM, then two options exist. One is to issue the paper essentially as it is right now, with only the addition of an introductory note to tell the reader what the paper is (and is not) and to indicate its scope.
- 3. The other option is to expand the scope of the basic paper to introduce some thoughts about the relative importance of various motivations discussed and to identify the groupings within the Soviet leadership associated with each. This would, of course, bring in additional political and psychological factors and would call for lengthening the paper by several pages.

BRUCE C. CLARKE, Jr.
Director
Strategic Research

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Attachment:

TAB A: Suggestions for Change

TAB B: _Memorandum from

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3. Last paragraph, page 6: This paragraph could be redrafted as follows:

The above may be summed up by noting that the Soviets continue to be in a very serious competion with the US, and this competition will remain over the long term. The primary energy in this competition is currently devoted to military oriented R&D. Reduction of the technology gap is -- in the first instance -a primary objective. Even this could yield important advantages because the closed nature of the Soviet society permits the exploitation of technological surprise to a greater degree than in the case of the US. In the longer term, of course, technological superiority will be important to the Soviets. But even technological equality could give the Soviets the basis for great flexibility in dealing with the US and with other threats that may evolve over the longer term.

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE -

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20305

SF/A

.February 26, 1973

PERSONAL MEMORANDUM FOR DR. HENRY KISSINGER

You asked for an estimate regarding just where the Soviets may be going with their strategic force development programs. The attached paper deals with that question. I trust that it is responsive to your needs. We have tried to keep it brief; let me know if you want further amplification.

James R. Schlesinger

Attachment:

"Forces Shaping the Soviet Strategic Weapons Development Program"

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

.February 26, 1973

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